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STATEMENT OF FACTS

It \vould be less than accurate to allow the defendant's statement of claimed facts go without
reply; had things been as the defendant claimed in their statement Rosamond Mattox would not have
died a pain-filled death while suffering from multiple broken bones.
While the defendant does respond to plaintiffs statement of facts, their response is without
factual support. Most of the citations to the record refer to either exhibits attached to counsel's
affidavit (and therefore without weight as counsel was \,,"holly incompetent to lay any foundation for
the records, which largely do not suppoli the defendant's story), or referred to attachments attached
to the affidavit of Wendy Thomason (such as the care plan adopted in August 0[2008) which do not

offer any support for

claims of the defendant. For example, the care plan, to which the defendant

points as exemplifYing the extraordinary measures they took, was so thoroughly neglected by LCL
staff as to render it useless: 86% NON-compliance ,,'lith check and change; 74% NON-compliance
with use of bed side rails; 86% NON-compliance with a low bed; and 99.3% NON-compliance v.lith
hip protectors, (R. Vol. IlL p. all of which are integral portions of the defendant's tale.
Not only are Defendant's claims are without fllctual support (as touched on above), worse
yet, their response distorts the factual record beyond recognition:
the "fall release" rel~renced by defendants, was signed more that TWO (2) YEARS
prior (R. Vol. It P 331 dated September 4, 2006). For over a year after the signing
of the release her falls DECREASED to ZERO falls per year.

-1-

Then as the

defendant's compliance with their own care plan felL so did Ms. Mattox's safety as
she had NINE (9) documented falls in the final 10 months of her life. (R. Vol. III,
pp. 497) During this time defendants were failing to follow their own care plan
between 74 and 99.3 % of the time.
The defendant references a Do Not Resuscitate order, suggesting that somehow an
order to not jumpstart her heart should it suddenly stop (R. Vol. III. p. 488) absolves
them for the 74 - 99.3% NON-compliance with the care plan and 9 taIls in 10
months, including the final broken hip that killed her.
The defendant points out that Ms. Mattox was admitted for terminal end-of-life
compassionate comfort care. Such a status shouldn't be considered a license to kilL
but rather it an order to care. While it is true that Ms. Mattox was admitted for
"terminal end-of.. life compassionate comfort care" ... that did not occur shortly before
her death, it was years before. The records cited to (R, VoL II, pp. 336,356) are fi'om
2006 and 2005, and this comi has records before it going back to 2004 (R. VoLlI, p.
391): Ms Mattox died n'om her second broken hip on November 1,2008. (R. VoL
III, p. 592.)
The defendant actually claims that Ms. IVIattox' s son (Gene) "continuously interfered
with 10\\iering the mediation [sic] levels ... " Gene isn't a doctor, couldn't order
medications, couldn't give the medications, and the defendant's claim that his actions

"substantially contributed to Decedent's fall. R. Vol. II, pp.367-379" is without £Y!Y
factual support. Not only are the records cited to without foundation and not to be
considered, but there is nothing contained therein to support this wild claim. Further,
defendant has not o±Iered a single expert who could have offered such an opinion.
The claim is without any factual, opinion or legal basis.
The defendant continues to distol1 the historical record by claiming that Gene Mattox
"specifically dcclined the use of hipsters and requested they not be placed on his
mother. R. Vol. II, p. 391." In 2004, more than FOUR YEARS before the fatal falL
this was true. In 2005, Ms. Mattox fell two (2) times. In 2006, she fell two (2) times.
There are no documented falls in 2007. (R. Vol. III, p. 497.) In 2008 there were
NINE (9) falls in 10 months, including falls that led to two (2) separate broken hips
and a compression fracture of the spine (R. Vol. III, p. 498-505). There were no
declinations for "hipster" use in 2008, 2007, 2006 or 2005. In fact, during 2008,
Gene attended a care plan conference CR. Vol. III, p. 528), and the plan that was
developed and agreed to INCLUDED the use of "hipsters" (R. Vol. III, p. 539). But
despite this plan, the defendants violated this 99.3% of the time in the last months of
Ms. Mattox's life.
Defendant claims that "[i]n the afternoon of October 31, 2008, Decedent was taking
a nap and the movement alann on her bed mattress sounded and a CNA went directly

to her room." Despite having a citation to the record, there is no support in the
record for such a claim. The page cited to by defendant is, again, submitted by the
incompetent affidavit of counsel. But even accepting it for illustrative purposes, we
see it says, "Resdt found sitting on floor next to Bathroom Door. ... " (R. Vol. I, p. 98)
Nurse Thomason reviewed these records, in depth, and noted, "October 31, 2008, at
2:20 p.m. Ms. Mattox was fuund on the floor (the ninth and last fall) by the
bathroom, her right leg was under her body and her left leg was stretched in front of
her, she was complaining if right hip pain. There was no mention of a functional
alarm in place per doctor's orders and care plan. At

p.m. Ms. Mattox was

transferred to Tri-State Hospital and was diagnosed with a right hip fracture."

It is of concern to the plaintiffs that the defendant's claimed facts are without factual support
and could be a source of confusion to the Court. Care is to be taken to be accurate in representing
the record and the case to the Court and it is of concern that such care is not evidenced by the
defendant.

ARGUMENT
A.

A motion for SJlmmarv judgment must be properlv supported bv affidavit before the burden
shifts to the responding partv.
Idaho case la\v and the Idaho rules are consistent and clear:

'" When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule [by competent affidavit including swom or certified records and supplemented
with depositions, inteITogatories or other affidavits], an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response,
by affidavits or as othenvise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for triaL ...
LR.C.P.56(e).
Caselaw is consistent with this rule, the initial showing must be made by the moving party.
and only once the motion "is made and supported" does the burden shift to the non-moving party.

Celotex and the cases cited by the defendant support this proposition: "[t]he party moving for
summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish there is no 'genuine issue of material fact'
and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (citation omitted.]" DUl1nick v Elder,
126 Idaho 308, 31 L 882 P.2d 475 (Idaho App. 1994). The Dlilmick court then explains that when
the moving party for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production of proof at trial, then
the lack of genuine issue of material fact may be "met by establishing the absence of evidence" on
a material element (Id.); which may be done through interrogatories and depositions as set forth in
the rule. There was no attempt by the defendant to offer depositions or interrogatories to establish
an "absence of evidence" in the instant case; they relied exclusively on the nine- sentence
conclusions of Carol McIver.
In Peterson v Shore, 146 Idaho 76, 197 P.3d 789 (Idaho App. 2008) (cited by defendant as
one of the Celotex line of cases) cites the Dlinnick case and then expounds in hO\v the absence of
evidence may be demonstrated:

Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing
with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's
evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v.
Honker's JVfini-Jv[art, Inc .. 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App.2000).

Peterson at 478.
The other case cited in this string isAntim v Fred Jvfeyer Stores, Inc, 150 Idaho 774, 251 P.3d
602 (2011), which also relies on E1iopoius v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 848 P .2d 984 eCt. App. 1992)
and Heath and Dunnick to establish the proposition that a party may rely on intenogatories and
depositions to establish a lack of evidence on a material element
Similarly, the Bromley case does not leave room for doubt, it is only "[0 ]nce the absence of
evidence on an element has been shm'v1l" that the burden shifts and then the non-moving party must
also "produce affidavits, depositions, or other evidence establishing an issue of material fact."
(Bromley v Garey. 132 Idaho 807, 810-811. 979 P.2d 1165. 1168 (1999).)

This standard is stated and re-stated throughout the rule and caselaw. The defendant's
apparent confusion comes from a mis-reading ofthc case of Chandler v Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 215
P.3d 485 (2009). In Chandler, not only does the Supreme Court reaffirm the foregoing rule and
analysis, the Court then addresses who carries the burden when the defendant has raised affirmative
defenses. The Court introduces this analysis by stating "[t]his summary judgment standard leaves
open the question which party bears the burden of production as to a nonmoving defendant's
affirmative defense." But such analysis does not apply to the case at bar, the parties herein are not
dealing with affirmative defenses. The question before this court turns on \vhether a self-serving,
-6-

nine sentence set of vague conclusions, without more, is sufficient to transfer the burden on to the
non-moving party. The plaintiff submits it is not. Summary judgment was improperly granted for
defendants and this case should be remanded.

B.

The PlaintifT's experts are qualified to testify.
Two experts, a local doctor and a qualified nurse, Both \\'jth the requisite experience and

knowledge to properly offer the needed expel1 testimony.
Wendy Thomason is not only a \vell-qualified nurse, she became fully acquainted with the
proper standard of care. Nurse Thomason is "fully acquainted with the federal laws and regulations
governing skilled nursing facilities and [is] acquainted with the applicable standard of care on the
national level" (R. Vol. III, p. 494). Shc had been an expert in Idaho on previous occasions (Tr. p.
27, 11 5-6: R. Vol. III. p. 494), and is familiar with the Idaho laws and regulations governing skilled
nursing facilities.
Thus knowing the state and federal regulations and standards, Nurse Thomason became
familiar with the standard of care for a skilled nursing facility in "the Lewiston region in 2008". To
obtain this familiarity, Nurse Thomason spoke with four local medical practicioners. Each of the
four are named. Each of the four have a basis for their own knowledge of the standard of care for

a skilled nursing facility in that area for the applicable time frame. Nurse Thomason then swears that
she has "become acquainted [with the standard of care for a skilled nursing facility in the Lewiston

region in 2008] and therefore [she has] knowledge of that standard of care." (R. Vol. III, pp. 494-5.)
Nurse Thomason provided an I8-page affidavit with an additional 50+ pages of attachments.
The four named medical professionals with whom Nurse Thomason spoke includes two
doctors. Both of whom treat elderly patients in the area skilled nursing facilities, and did so during
2008. Dr. Fore worked with wound patients: Dr. Mackay is a primary care physician. Both of them
are personally aware of the standard of care for nurses in nursing home in the Lewiston region in
2008. The differences between the ease at bar and the cases relied upon by defendant are significant
and perhaps can be easily seen as follows:

Dulane,v and Arregui compared to ly!attox
Number of Local Practitioners consulted:
Dulaney:

Arregui: J

Mattox:

4

Local Practitioner's Specialty and Basis of Knowledge of Defendants Practice Area:

Dulaney:

Local Practitioner identified, but neither worked in or with the specialty at
issue. The defendant was an orthopaedic surgeon working in the Emergency Room.
The local practitioner practiced internal medicine at the V A in Boise and though he
was board certified in Emergency Medicine, had neither practiced Emergency
Medicine nor practiced in an ER in Boise.
The second person consulted was a neurologist in California, who had
practiced in Boise near the timeframe. but who had no basis of knowledge of the
standard of care for an orthopaedist in an emergency room.

Arregui:

Local practitioner NOT identified, worked in specialty, but no indication of
experience or basis of knowledge. The proposed expert was from California, had
never been to Idaho, (at one time testified she had never spoken to anyone in Idaho),
who at some point spoke to an unnamed chiropractor, who's type of practice was not
described, and who's basis of knowledge of the standard of care was unexplained,
-8-

and it was unknown how long the unnamed chiropractor had even practiced in Idaho.
Afartox:

Four local practitioners identified. Each work in or with the specialty at issue,
each have a basis of knowledge. The violation is of nursing standards in a skilled
care facility (nursing home). Of the four local practitioners, two are medical doctors
who treat residents of area nursing homes: one for wound care, the other a the
primary care physician. Both reference extensive experience in the relevant year in
dealing with nursing staff in area nursing homes. Both have actual knowledge of the
standard. (R.Vol. III, p. 417)
The other two are nurses: Nurse Stellmon conducted her own survey to
familiarize herselfvvith the standard of care in nursing homes in 2008, and conveyed
that information to Nurse Thomason. (R. Vol. III, p. 496.) The final expert, Nurse
Lemon, holds a Masters degree in the relevant area of expertise, has extensive
knowledge of and experience in the skilled nursing sector before, during and after the
relevant time period: she been the administrator of an area nursing home, taught
geriatric care to local nursing students, and did so at the time ofthe incident and had
been and was a nurse consultant for adult care facilities. (R. Vol. m. p. 495, 516.)

It should be remembered that Nurse Thomason had more of a basis than just these four local
experts for forming her understanding and knowledge of the local standard (the extensive
backgrounds ofthese four qualified professionals has been set forth in greater detail in the opening
brief and \V'ithin the affidavits and attachments of Dr. Mackay and Nurse Thomason). Nurse
Thomason was an experienced expert in Idaho, she was completely acquainted with both the State
and Federal regulations which control the administration of care

a skilled nursing fucility (R. Vol.

III, pp. 494, 496). She revie\ved the defendant's records relating to the care of this patient (which
includes care plans and the documentation of what was and was not done, thus showing abject failure
I

to follow even their ovm rules and is not this virtually negligence per se , to fail to keep the most

I It is acknowledged that this COllrt has beld that negligence per se is not applicable to
medical negligence cases, such as this. Schmechel v Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 219 P .3d 1] 92 (2009).

basic commitments of care made to the patient and her hunily; and which revealed nursing staff
actually changing the doctor's order in violation of state and federal regulations (RVot. III, pp. 502-

03); review of the records ofthe local hospitals (St. Joseph's in Lewiston and Tri-State in Clarkston.
W A) revie\v of the doctor's records; plus a review ofinfom1ation available regarding the defendant,
including: national awards, ratings and reviews from CMS (Center for Medicare Services) and other
organizations, and the history of substantiated complaints for defendant 2•
Each of these areas she investigated gave her more understanding of the applieable standard
of care, and provided it fl.-om diflerent perspectives (including the defendant's 0\\111 perspective \vhen
reviewing a\vards, complaints and care plans). When taken as a whole: interviewing tour disparate
professionals who teach and work in and with skilled nursing, \\'ho individually have a basis of
knowledge and know the standard ofcare; a vie\v of the regulatory scheme from the federal and state
levels; experience as an expert in Idaho: and continuing to nanow the focus down to the explicit
errors committed in violating the standard at the most basic level, the care plan, Nurse Thomason
had an intimate understanding of the standard of care. Even if one were to believe that anyone of
the elements is insufficient, the accumulation of knowledge of the standard of care applicable to this

Thus, it is expressly NOT plaintitTs position that is negligence per se involved in this case. but
rather that the violations by the defendant are of such a basic and plain nature as to be clear and
unmistakable to an expert with experience and understanding of the standard of care in this arena
... such as Nurse Thomason and Dr. Mackay.
2 Nurse Thomason also review the affidavit of Carol McIver in her efforts to become
fully acquainted with all the relevant facts and information. While it was reviewed by Nurse
Thomason, it is of no help to anyone.
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case is, and should be, more than adequate to meet our legal standard.
So too, Dr. Mackay, who provides primary care area nursing home residents (R.VoL III, p.
484), and who was involved in and oversaw the care (or neglect thereof) provided to Ms. Mattox
until her death. The defendant's nursing staff was in frequent communication with Dr. Mackay (R.
Vol. III, pp. 484-85, 493-511), reporting to him each problem and discussing changes in care and
condition. Averaging approximately three exchanges per month ofher final ten months, Dr. Mackay
was highly involved in the care of Ms. Mattox: more than "any other patient" he as in nursing
homes.

CR.

VoL III, p. 484.) As a primary carc physician in the Lewiston region (otIices in

Clarkston, Washington at Tri-State) who has many patients in nursing homes and who has done so
for many years (R. Vol. III, p. 496), with on-going nursing exchanges for all of his patients through
2008, Dr. Mackay had a wonderful vantage to obtain personal knowledge of the applicable standard
of care.

C.

-

Idaho code defines "communitv"
. as it relates to medical negligence as [o11O\vs:
~

As used in this act, the term "community" refers to that geographical area ordinarily
served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such care was or
allegedly should have been provided.

I.e.

6-1012. Though the defendant complains that plaintiff has used the term "Lewiston region"

instead of community, the defendant's complaint is without merit.
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First, "community refers to that geographical area .. ,", As members of the Court may know,
Lew'iston is part ofthe LC Valley (Lewis-Clark Valley), The valley consists primarily of Lewiston,
Idaho and Clarkston, Washington; however, a quick look at the map proves there is certainly more
in the valley: Lewiston; Lewiston Orchards (not part of the City of Lewiston) and other
unincorporated portions of Nez Perce County: Clarkston Heights (not part of the City of Clarkston),
the City Asotin, and portions ofunicorporated Asotin County, But St. Joseph's hospital also draws
(and indeed is the primary hospital for) Lapwai: Sweetwater; Culdesac: Winchester; Pierce: Lenore;
Anatone, W A; Cloverland, W A: and others. Indeed, St Joseph's is aregionai medical center; hence
the name St. Joseph Regional Medical Center (SJRMC),
It should be noted that there are two hospitals that sel"/e the valley: both SJRMC and TriState Memorial Hospital (in Clarkston, WA). This case has ties to both. Ms. Mattox was variously
transferred to SJRMC and Tri-State to deal with injuries sut1ered at defendant's facility, After the
final fall, defendants transp0l1ed Ms. Mattox to Tri-State.
In the LC area (region or valley), there are several skilled nursing facilities with whom Dr.
Fore and Dr. Mackay work.
Defendant's argument is without merit.

D.

A Final Order Dismissing: the Complaint is an AppealabJe Order.
A party may appeal a final judgment so long as it meets the definition of judgment as stated
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in Rule 54(a). Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a) sets forth the appealable judgments and orders in civil
cases. Under that rule, "[f]inal judgments, as defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Proeedure" and "[a]ny order made after final judgment" are appealable. LA.R. 11 (a)(l) & (7). Rule
54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure defines what constitutes a tinal judgment as follows:
!!Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled "Judgment" or
"Decree". A judgment shall state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for
relief in the action. Such relief can include dismissal with or without prejudice."
In Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co.,13 7 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002), the Court attempted
to define the court documents that would constitute final judgments for purposes of LA.R. 11 (a)(1).
The Court stated:
Whether an instrument is an appealable order or judgment mllst be detennined by its content
99
and substance, and not by its title. Idaho Best, Inc. v. First Security Bank of Idaho,
(1978). As a general rule, a final judgment is an order or judgment
Idaho 517,584 P .2d I
that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a final
determination of the rights of the parties. Davis v. Peacock. 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362
(1999). It must be a separate document, Hunting v. Clark COUnly School Dist. No. 161, 129
Idaho 634, 931 P.2d 628 (1997); IDAHO R. Cry.
58(a), that on its face states the relief
granted or denied.

Id at 867, 55 P.3d at 321.
In the instant case, the court signed an Order to Dismiss Without Prejudice on January 9,
2013. On January 11,2013 the trial court signed a Judgment on the Order to Dismiss with Prejudice.
Once the Judgment was entered. it became a final judgment as defined by Rule 54(a) and is thereby
appealable under LA.R. 1 1(a)(l). Appellant is appealing the Judgment of the Dismissal with
Prejudice (see: Notice of Appeal, appeal is from "the final judgment, entered in the above entitled
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th

action on the 9 day of January, 2013 .... The issues on appeal are as follows: All issues of fact and
law .... ") which is allowable under LA.R. 11(a)(l) and where there is a final Judgment a party may
appeal.
Defendant's argument is without merit. This appeal is properly taken.

E.

The case 1m\' is ,veU-settled that an appellate COUlt may not assess attorney fees to the
prevailing party unless it finds that the appeal \vas defended on untenable grounds. In a line of cases
beginning with JV!inich v. Gem State Developers. Inc., the Court has consistently ruled that attorney's
fees may be awarded vvhere the appellate court makes a finding that the appeal was without a
reasonable basis. Heritage Excavation, Inc. v Briscoe, 141 Idaho 40. 105 P .3d 700 (App. 2005):
Te(ford Lands, LLC v. Cain, ~~~'-"-''-'''-''''-'''-~~~'-=-'-- (2013); jv!errill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho

840.87 P.3d 949 (2004)(attorney fees awarded \vhere the Court found that Appellant's claim was
"invalid, is frivolous and without foundation").
Idaho Code section 1 121 provides that "[1]n any civil action,the judge may award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties .... " Such an award is appropriate
when this Court has the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or defended frivolously.
unreasonably or \vithout foundation. Alinich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911,
918,591 P.2d 1078,1085 (1979).
Love/ass v. S'tvord, 140 Idaho 1052]

90 P.3c1330 (2004.)
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In the instant case, Appellant asserts that the court abused its discretion v"hen it struck the
affidavits of Dr. Jayme MacKay and Wendy Thomason and granted Summary Judgment in favor of
Defendant. These are issues of fact and law that are appropriate for review. Appellant has set forth
various legal authorities demonstrating how the trial court elTed. This appeal is neither frivolous nor
without foundation and attorney fees should not be awarded to Respondent.

CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons. the trial court erred. The trial court should be reversed
and the case remanded for proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

day of March, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of March, 201 I caused true and correct
copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to be served via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to the
following:
Nancy Garrett
Ganett Richardson, PLLC
738 S. Bridgeway Place, Suite 100
Eagle, ID 83616
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